1 This is sometimes called the "tax assignment problem." In this paper I reflect on how both the theory and the practice of tax assignment depend on history. The paper presents "ruminations;" it is not meant to be a systematic discussion of tax assignment.
INTRODUCTION

O ne of the most important questions of intergovernmental fiscal relations is "who (which level of government) should tax what?"
1 This is sometimes called the "tax assignment problem." In this paper I reflect on how both the theory and the practice of tax assignment depend on history. The paper presents "ruminations;" it is not meant to be a systematic discussion of tax assignment. state of knowledge changes. A more useful paradigm for that purpose might ask how benevolent Martian fiscal experts landing on earth at various points in time would suggest assigning taxes, assuming that they want to help maximize the welfare of the Earthlings living in the particular nation where they land.
This formulation would force us to ask several important questions, including these: When the Martians arrive, what kind of economy do they find? Do they land in a developed country, a less-developed country (LDC), or a country in transition from socialism (CIT)? What is the relative importance of primary products, manufacturing, and services? Are valuable natural resources geographically concentrated? How well developed are interstate and international markets in goods and services? How well developed is the capital market? Do the Internet and electronic commerce exist? What is the state of knowledge about the technology of taxation and the economic effects of taxation? What is the capacity for tax administration (at the various levels of government) and compliance? How inclined are taxpayers to pay the taxes they owe "voluntarily?" What is the geographic landscape? Are the Earthlings concerned about resource allocation? About income redistribution? About macroeconomic stabilization? What expenditure functions are assigned to various levels of government? 3 This paper addresses these questions and some of the many subsidiary questions they raise. It takes as given a federal system with three levels of government and concentrates primarily on the assignment of taxes between the top and second-tier levels, which for expositional convenience are called the federal and state levels (except when discussing tax assignment in a particular country); the third level is called "local" and the bottom two tiers together are called "subnational."
4 On occasion the paper discusses fiscal relations within the European Union (EU); although the EU is not a federation, it raises interesting questions of fiscal federalism.
The next section discusses the meaning and methods of tax assignment, issues that are not addressed adequately in most discussions of the topic. Subsequent sections review some of the implications of Musgrave's three-branch view of public finance, discuss the importance of accretions to knowledge-of the technology of taxation and of the economic effects of taxation, suggest how economic evolution affects the conventional wisdom on tax assignment, and indicate how some of the tax assignments found in various federa-3 This question assumes implicitly that the number of levels of government and the boundaries of various subnational jurisdictions are predetermined and fixed; see the next paragraph of the text. As noted in the discussion of the role of geography below, rational tax assignment depends on the size of subnational jurisdictions and the location of population centers within them; see also King (1993) , p. 281-2. Post-apartheid South Africa provides an interesting example in which these issues were addressed in writing the new constitution. In one proposal, wisely rejected, the Johannesburg metropolitan area would have been divided among several second-tier jurisdictions, in order to provide each with roughly the same fiscal capacity. This would have aggravated problems of tax assignment, by stimulating unhealthy intra-metropolitan tax competition, cross-border shopping, and commuting between jurisdictions. Further examination of these issues would take us far afield. 4 To some extent the same questions arise in federal and unitary systems, the primary difference being the degree of control national governments exercise over the fiscal affairs of subnational units. In discussing federal systems it is generally convenient to distinguish between the sovereignty of states and the autonomy of local governments. But local governments in some countries with unitary systems (e.g., the Nordic countries) may have fiscal autonomy that exceeds the fiscal sovereignty of states in others with federal systems (e.g., Germany and Australia). Nor do data necessarily give an accurate picture, if the revenues subnational governments obtain from tax-sharing-argued below to be more accurately described as a form of grant-are attributed to those governments; see King (1993), pp. 284-5. tions are legacies of history. The final section reiterates the danger of assuming "one size fits all" in tax assignment.
THE MEANING AND METHODS OF TAX ASSIGNMENT
"Who should tax what?" does not adequately describe the tax assignment problem; to do that, we must add, "and how?" A full description of tax assignment involves answering four questions, besides which level of government gets the revenue from a particular tax: 1) which level chooses the taxes that a given level imposes; 2) which defines the tax bases; 3) which sets tax rates; and 4) which administers the various taxes. 5 Where subnational governments lack control over all these decisions-but especially control over tax rates-there will be vertical fiscal imbalance, even if subnational revenues are adequate to meet expenditure needs. Tax assignment is not so much about the overall adequacy of revenue as about control over marginal sources of revenue. 6 There appear to be three archetypical ways of answering these four questions. In a system based purely on independent legislation and administration, each jurisdiction at a given level of government would answer the four questions as it wishes, subject perhaps to limited constitutional prohibitions (for example, not taxing international trade at the state level). (In what follows I will use the term "independent taxation" for the cumbersome term in italics.)
Tax assignment in the United States follows this pattern; subject only to the Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. constitution and minor laws enacted by the U.S. Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the states have virtually free rein to levy any taxes they wish-and to administer them as they wish.
7 As discussed below, the Canadian provinces enjoy similar latitude in tax policy; judicial decisions have nullified a constitutional provision that might appear to prohibit provincial sales taxes and excises.
In less extreme versions of this alternative, choices (for example, of the tax base or tax rates) might be more constrained, by the nation's constitution, by compacts among subnational governments, 8 or by laws enacted by a higher level government. 9 The constitutions of some countries identify specific taxes that various 5 I have laid out this line of thinking in greater detail in various places, among them McLure (1998) and (2000b) . 6 Richard states the proposition as follows: . . . "meaningful tax assignment refers to the assignment of the ability (and responsibility) to determine own revenues in some meaningful way. Subnational governments may be fully financed from what they (and others) may consider their "own" taxes. But if, as is often the case in developing countries, they cannot decide which taxes they levy, what the tax bases are, what rates are imposed, or how intensively taxes are enforced they actually have no control at all over revenues and hence have really been "assigned" no revenue power at the margin-though perhaps much revenue. The single most critical variable from this perspective is control over the effective tax rate." 7 This is totally consistent with the views Alexander Hamilton expressed in The Federalist Papers, No. XXXII: " . . . the individual States should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants." Hamilton argues in the same paper that the prohibition of state imposition of import and export duties implies that the states have the right to impose all other taxes. 8 For example, the members of the EU have agreed to harmonize their value added taxes. There is no similar agreement on harmonization of the state sales taxes in the United States; see McLure (forthcoming). 9 The federal government may use economic incentives, rather than prohibitions, to affect the choices of taxes levied by subnational governments. Since the federal government of the United States allows credit for 90 percent of state unemployment taxes and for much of the death and gift taxes levied by the states, states have little incentive not to impose these taxes. Until relatively recently it also allowed itemized deductions for state and local excises and sales taxes, in effect subsidizing use of these sources of revenue. Now individuals are allowed to deduct only state and local income and property taxes. On the deduction for sales taxes, see Zodrow (1999) . levels of government are allowed to levy and/or those that are prohibited.
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Surcharges involve one level of government administering the taxes of another level. Although it is commonly the higher level that administers taxes for the lower, the opposite constellation is not unknown; Quebec, the only Canadian province to levy a Value Added Tax (VAT), administers the federal tax within its boundaries. (Most of the Canadian provinces rely on the federal government for administration of their income taxes; this reflects provincial choices, not a legal requirement. Quebec's administration of its own taxes, as well as the federal VAT, reflects concerns with the province's ethnic identity -an issue also found in the oblasts of Russia.
11 The American states rely heavily on the administrative efforts of the federal Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but fully retain the right to administer their own taxes.) While minor variations in tax bases can be accommodated, large variations make surcharges unworkable, and complete uniformity (as in the Swedish individual income tax) minimizes complexity. This arrangement preserves the ability of governments at different levels to set their own tax rates, without the complexity of multiple laws and duplicative tax administrations.
Tax sharing involves one level of government sharing revenues from particular taxes with governments at another level, typically those where revenues are deemed to originate.
12 Ordinarily higher level governments share with lower level governments the revenues from taxes the former legislate and administer. Since (at least under the arrangement just described) individual lower level governments have no control over any of the four basic questions of tax assignment, tax sharing is essentially a form of grant, and not a method of tax assignment. I consider it because of its practical significance as an alternative to true tax assignment in many countries. For example, the poorest provinces of Canada have agreed to share revenues from the VAT (which is a joint federal-provincial levy in those provinces), rather than continuing to exercise their constitutional right to levy their own sales taxes, as do the other provinces (except for Alberta, which has no sales tax).
13
MUSGRAVE'S THREE-BRANCH SYSTEM AND THE EVOLUTION OF CONCERNS
Richard Musgrave (1959) usefully distinguishes three fiscal functions of government, which he conceives of being performed by three conceptually distinct "branches" of government: resource allocation, income redistribution, and macroeconomic stabilization. Taxes of the allocation branch should, to the extent possible, reflect benefits of public services. By comparison, progressive individual income taxes and corporate income taxes would be used to implement income redistribution and, through their countercyclical effects on revenues and disposable income, endogenous macro-10 See, for example, the constitutions of Brazil (Articles 145-61), Mexico (Article 73, Section XXIX; Article 117, Section IX), and South Africa (Articles 228 and 229), and the tax codes of various members of the former Soviet Union (e.g., Articles 3 and 4 of the 1995 Tax Code of Kazakhstan). The list of taxes the national government of Mexico can impose is commonly interpreted to mean that the states cannot levy those taxes. Until amended in 1913, the U.S. Constitution effectively precluded federal adoption of an income tax. 11 On the interplay of ethnic separation and regional demands in Russia, see Litvack (1994) . 12 I distinguish this from revenue sharing, in which pools of revenues are shared, commonly based on formulas that are not intended to reflect where revenues originate. For example, in Germany the laender administer the federal VAT, revenue from which is shared among the laender on the basis of a formula. Revenue from the recently enacted Australian VAT is shared with the states in a manner that equalizes fiscal capacity; see below.
In neither tax sharing nor revenue sharing do subnational governments control taxation at the margin. 13 Joint federal provincial decision making implies that the federal government has also lost fiscal autonomy. economic stabilization. Taxes might also be varied exogenously to implement stabilization policy.
The Key Role of Benefit Taxation
Whereas assuring the optimal allocation of resources is properly the function of all levels of government, Musgrave and others commonly assign responsibility for income redistribution and macroeconomic stabilization entirely to the federal level.
14 This assignment of fiscal responsibilities has important implications for tax assignment. First, for the most part state and local governments should levy taxes that reflect benefits of public services as closely as possible. Second, it seems likely that only the federal government should levy progressive individual income taxes and corporate income taxes; subnational governments are not likely to be effective in using these taxes for either income redistribution or macroeconomic stabilization, the taxes are not likely to reflect the benefits of public services provided by state and local governments, and they are likely to distort the geographic allocation of resources. (The accuracy of these speculations regarding the pattern of benefits depends on the assignment of expenditure functions and the incidence of benefits of public services, both to be discussed shortly.) This does not mean that state and local governments should not levy individual income taxes, only that their income taxes should be structured to reflect benefits of public services.
15
Given the importance of benefit taxation in the theory of tax assignment, the optimal assignment of taxes of Musgrave's allocation branch depends on the assignment of expenditure functions. Taxes intended to reflect benefits of public services (e.g., education or construction and maintenance of roads and highways) or to charge for other costs imposed on society (e.g., for medical care for smokers and those who consume alcoholic beverages) should be assigned to the level of government incurring the costs. 16 That governments at all levels should charge those who create costs is required for fairness and economic efficiency, as well as for the financial viability of governments.
17 Thus, while state or local financing is generally appropriate in the case of local roads and state highways, federal financing is more likely appropriate for an interstate highway system.
18
Taxes that closely reflect benefits of public services generally would not be adequate to finance governments at any level; substantial amounts of expenditures must be financed with taxes that are only loosely related to benefits, if at all. This does not mean, however, that the benefit principle is not important in deciding the structure of subnational taxation. Perhaps the most important issues are 1) whether subnational taxes should be levied on businesses or on individuals and 2) whether broad-based taxes levied on individuals (or intended to be paid by them) should be levied where people live or where they work.
I would argue that most public services provided by subnational governments are consumed by individuals, and not by businesses. If true, this implies that there is little case for a subnational corporate income tax (except to prevent incorporation to avoid individual income tax), property taxes on business property, or origin-based sales taxes.
19 Imposition of subnational taxes on business that are not related to benefits received can have several adverse results, among them tax exporting, distortion of the location of economic activity, 20 and distortion of the level of public services. 21 Tax competition between subnational governments is useful in preventing imposition of taxes on business that are not related to benefits of public spending and thus in facilitating Tiebout-type efficiency in subnational provision of public service.
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I would also contend that most benefits of public services are consumed where people live, and not where they work. (To see this, consider education and publicly provided health services. 23 ) If true, this implies that residence-based income taxes and destination-based sales taxes are generally preferable to income and payroll taxes levied by the jurisdiction of employment for the finance of most services provided by subnational governments.
24
Progressive individual income taxes generally are not appropriate for use by 19 In contrast to destination-based taxes, origin-based sales taxes are unlikely to be shifted unless a state dominates the market for a taxed product. Thus I consider them to be taxes on business. 20 A tax does not affect the location of economic activity if a) the tax reflects the benefits of public spending or b) the taxed activity is geographically immobile. If neither of these conditions prevails, the tax may distort the location of economic activity. In the first case, tax exporting is appropriate, if benefits are exported. In the second case the tax may be exported to non-resident owners of capital or land; of course, capital becomes more mobile-and burden on owners of capital becomes less likely-with the passage of time. If the taxing state dominates the national market for the product, the tax is exported in part to non-resident consumers. Even so, taxation affects the location of economic activity unless demand is inelastic. Exporting of subnational taxes on business ordinarily does not take the form of higher product prices; unless the taxing jurisdiction dominates a national market-a rare occurrence, especially in a globalized world -businesses subject to its taxes cannot affect prices and thus cannot shift business taxes to consumers. (In an earlier time market dominance by taxing jurisdictions was probably greater; consider, for example, Michigan's dominance of the automobile market a half century ago.) Rather, if such taxes are exported, it is to owners of the taxed businesses (or land) who live outside the taxing state and (because such taxes can be deducted in calculating liability for federal income tax) to taxpayers across the country. Besides being unfair, tax exporting distorts the choice between public and private consumption, by reducing the tax-price residents (who are the only ones who vote) pay for public services. 21 Non-benefit subnational taxes on mobile factors can lead to underprovision of public services; see Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1999) . See also note 24 on "benefit" taxes that do not reflect benefits received at the margin. 22 See Brennan and Buchanan (1980) . 23 This discussion is predicated on an assumption that external benefits or economies of scale provide the primary justification for public provision of these services, both of which have substantial private components. If the rationale for public provision of these services is primarily redistributional, the benefit principle is not applicable. 24 Even if taxes are only loosely related to benefits, they are appropriate on equity grounds and they improve political decisions on the level of public services. Only if "benefit" taxes reflect benefits received at the margin will the taxes not distort economic decisions. If, instead, benefits and taxes are only loosely related and taxpayers receive the same benefits at the margin regardless of the taxes they pay, the taxes will distort marginal decisions. Similarly, because of the absence of a mechanism for the exclusion of those who do not pay, public services, once provided, may be overcrowded.
state and local governments, as the benefits of public spending are not likely to rise more rapidly than income, as income rises. (Again, education and health are good examples. Benefits of public education and public health services are not likely to rise more rapidly than income, especially since higher income individuals are much more likely than others to use private substitutes.) It is even less likely that benefits of public spending provided to businesses flow only to incorporated businesses and vary directly with corporate profits, as would be required for the corporate income tax to qualify as a benefit tax.
Implications of De-emphasizing Macroeconomic Stabilization and Income Redistribution
Since Musgrave published his treatise The Theory of Public Finance in 1959, professional opinion on the efficacy of exogenous fiscal policy has changed; most economists would now argue that monetary policy is a more effective stabilization instrument than fiscal policy, especially in light of the difficulties of changing fiscal policies quickly in response to changing economic conditions. Similarly, American public opinion on the desirability of progressive taxation has also waned, as evidenced by the reduction in top marginal federal individual income tax rate from 91 percent (subject to a maximum average rate of 87 percent) as late as 1964 to 39.6 percent today.
25 (Two important caveat should accompany this interpretation: First, because of various "loopholes," almost no one actually paid the high top marginal rates in the earlier period. Second, reforms that combine base broadening/loophole closing with lower marginal rates do not necessarily imply a less progressive tax burden.)
These two developments seem to make the imposition of progressive federal taxation less crucial. Some have even suggested that the federal government should eliminate its income tax, albeit for different reasons. 26 It might appear that if the federal governments did not require revenues from the individual income tax, state and local governments could make greater use of it.
This view is naive. 27 Although the U.S. system of tax assignment is based on what I have called "independent taxation," the states do not "go it alone" in legislating and administering their tax laws, the way nations do. Rather, most base their tax laws on the federal tax code and rely heavily on the IRS for the administration of their systems, dealing primarily with differences between state and federal laws. If the federal income tax and the IRS were to be eliminated, it would be necessary to replace them with state tax codes and "full-service" state tax administrations. Since there would be no federal tax law to serve as a starting point, there would probably be more diversity between state laws and thus more inconsistencies, inequities, and distortions. 28 There would be higher compliance costs and duplication of administrative costs. States might find it hard to obtain information on interest and dividends their residents receive from out-of-state entities.
State problems could be even more daunting if there were no federal corporate income tax. States would need to monitor transfer prices on transactions 25 This phenomenon is not limited to the United States. Top marginal tax rates in many countries are well below their levels of forty years ago. 26 Bill Archer, former Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee (1996, p. 5), said, "I want to tear the income tax system out by its roots and totally replace it with another form of taxation." 27 See Strauss (1997) for a more complete development of this theme. 28 Anyone doubting the risk of chaos need look no further than the state sales and use tax. See McLure (2000a) and references cited there.
between commonly owned foreign and domestic entities and implement rules for controlled foreign corporations. Given the difficulty of doing so, there would probably be a resurgence of state interest in worldwide unitary combination, which other countries would dislike. During the 1980s the federal government could pressure the states to abandon worldwide combination and rely on it to monitor transfer prices. It could not in good conscience oppose state use of worldwide combination if there were no federal income tax. There would also be other unfortunate international implications. The states are prohibited by the constitution from concluding treaties with other countries. Thus there would be substantial risk of international double taxation (or no taxation). Exchange of information with other nations would be even less likely than now, since the federal government would lack both the incentive and the vehicle to gain information. The U.S. would have no seat (or a weak voice) in the fiscal committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
In short, while the American states engage in "independent taxation," they rely heavily on the federal government for implementation of their income taxes. This might be reason enough for the federal government to continue to levy an income tax.
The Importance of Geography
Boundaries between subnational jurisdictions often do not match the limits of economic "catchment areas."
29 That is, the local labor market and/or the local retail market may not correspond neatly to a state or a local jurisdiction; where this is true there will be commuting between jurisdictions and/or cross-border shopping. Where cross-border commuting occurs, payroll tax revenues are likely to flow to the "wrong" jurisdiction-that is, to the one where employment occurs, instead of the jurisdiction of residence, which is more likely to be charged with providing the public services people use. This is less likely in the case of individual income taxes, due to reliance on residence-based taxation. However, residence-based income taxation generally requires the filing of tax declarations and is most easily accomplished if the federal government levies an income tax on whose coattails subnational governments can ride. 30 In developing countries many who pay income tax do not file tax returns -and should not, due to the administrative and compliance burden involved. This implies that, at least for the immediate future, there may not be much possibility of levying a residence-based subnational individual income tax in some such countries.
A similar problem may occur in the case of cross-border shopping; in this case revenues flow to jurisdictions where purchases are made, instead of to those where people live and consume public services. Indeed, the problems may be even worse, since there is an incentive for unhealthy competition between jurisdictions to attract regional shopping centers to maximize sales tax revenues. Needless to say, both these problems are generally greater, the smaller are subnational jurisdictions. This implies that taxes that may be appropriate for state governments (e.g., retail sales taxes) may be inappropriate for local governments.
Subsidiarity
For a variety of reasons taxes that may be appropriate for a federal government may not be appropriate for a subnational 29 Geographic boundaries that divide metropolitan areas inevitably result from drawing political boundaries along rivers, instead of along the crests of mountain ranges. 30 Where totally independent taxation by subnational governments is the rule, interstate cooperation between states of employment and states of residence is required. Perhaps the greatest impediment to subnational use of many taxes, especially in LDCs and CITs, is the lack of administrative capacity. While experience shows that in advanced countries subnational governments acting independently of the central government can effectively implement income and sales taxes, similar experience is likely to be rare (if not nonexistent) in LDCs and CITs; at best only surcharges-and, of course, tax sharingare likely to be feasible there, and experience reveals little success even with these alternatives.
Because many taxes are not appropriate for subnational governments, because it is difficult to implement the taxes that are appropriate, and because subnational taxes that are appropriate may not yield much revenue, a tendency toward vertical fiscal imbalance is found in many LDCs and CITs. 31 This shows the importance of subsidiarity-the notion that subnational governments (instead of a higher level of government) should be assigned any tax that they can implement (or that can be implemented for them) that is not inappropriate for their use. (This does not imply that the assignment should be exclusive-only that the higher level government should not monopolize the tax.) In explaining the requirement of subsidiarity, the Commission of the European Communities (1991, p. 7), has stated, "Member States should remain free to determine their tax arrangements, except where these would lead to major disruptions."
TAX ASSIGNMENT AS A MOVING TARGET
There may be a tendency to believe that proper tax assignment can be described, once and for all, based on first principles. In fact, this is not true, because knowledge of both tax technology and the effects of taxation change and because economies evolve.
32 This section suggests how the conventional wisdom about tax assignment may change with the accretion of knowledge. The next discusses how economic evolution may alter what we believe about proper tax assignment.
The Development of Tax Instruments
It seems axiomatic that tax assignment based on enumeration of either allowed or prohibited taxes is not likely to deal adequately with taxes that do not exist at the time assignment is made. Subnational sales taxes provide support for this proposition.
First consider the view of the Australian High Court that the provision of that country's constitution that reserves "duties of excise" to the Commonwealth (federal) government implies prohibition of state general sales taxes. Saunders (1997, p. 38) examines the opportunities for use of various taxes in LDCs and CITs. 32 Musgrave (1969, p. 125) , writes in a different context, "the economic objectives of tax policy vary with the stages of economic development, as do the economic criteria by which a good tax structure is to be judged." eral sales taxes had been widely understood. Similar comments might be made about the Canadian constitution, discussed below. Second, sales taxes have commonly been thought suitable for use by subnational governments. This assignment almost certainly, if implicitly, contemplates retail sales taxes; until recently VAT has been thought inappropriate for use by subnational governments.
33 Suppose for argument's sake a) that the VAT is the best way to levy a federal sales tax, b) that a subnational VAT (including surcharges on a national tax) is not feasible, and c) that administration of a dual system combining a federal VAT and a subnational retail sales tax (RST) would be overly cumbersome and costly. Where does that leave tax assignment? Should the federal government adopt the VAT and prohibit state use of the RST? Should it forego the VAT, so the states can impose the RST? Should it endorse the clumsy dual VAT/RST? Should it adopt the inferior RST instead of the VAT, so that states can impose surcharges on it? Suppose now that a subnational VAT can easily be imposed, especially in conjunction with a federal tax. Is a dual (federal-state) VAT now the assignment of choice? This mental experiment, in which assignment of RST may or may not be a good idea, depending on what we know (or at least believe) about the possibility of various levels of government employing the VAT, indicates clearly that what we think about tax assignment depends crucially on what we think is administratively feasible. 34 It would be a mistake, of course, to think that the range of possibilities in tax administration is immutable. Necessity may well be the mother of invention in the tax field. As long as governmental activity was so limited that it could be financed with customs duties and excises there was little reason-aside from the undesirable protection of local economic activity (which was presumably favored by those who benefitted from it) and other undesirable economic effects (which were probably not widely recognized)-to develop and employ tax instruments that have greater revenue yield (and less undesirable economic effects). The advent of social security and World War II, however, led to introduction of the federal payroll tax and the conversion of the federal income tax from a tax on the economic elite to a "mass tax."
35 (Even earlier the growing need for federal revenues saw passage of the 16 th amendment to the U.S. constitution, allowing introduction of an income tax that was not apportioned among the states in proportion to population.) The Great Depression of the 1930s (which undermined revenues from other sources) saw the introduction of the first state sales tax.
When the European Common Market was created there was considerable concern with the anti-competitive effects of indirect taxes (most of which were "cascading" turnover taxes on gross receipts) and fear that direct taxes might replace tariffs as the means of protecting domestic production. Collecting a retail sales tax from small retailers was thought to be infeasible. Thus it was decided that all the Member States should adopt the VAT, despite early recognition that it would be difficult to employ the destination principle for internal trade without fiscal frontiers or to employ the origin principle without uniform rates. Efforts continue to 33 See McLure (2000b) and references cited there. 34 The fact that the post-apartheid constitution of South Africa allows the central government to impose a VAT, but prohibits provincial VATs, including provincial surcharges on the national tax, is consistent with this proposition. See also the discussion of the legacy of history below. 35 Significantly, both relied on the development of withholding, which greatly facilitates timely collection of taxes (and also obscures their burden).
find a way to achieve a satisfactory destination-based tax system in the EU.
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Understanding of the Economic Effects of Taxation
The preferred structure of taxes may change as we learn more about the economic effects of taxation, and the resulting structural changes can affect tax assignment or the structure of subnational taxes. For example, turnover taxes would ideally be replaced by single-stage sales taxes, which in turn would be replaced by the VAT, primarily in an effort to reduce the adverse effects of taxing business inputs and to tax services more comprehensively. Within the category of single stage sales taxes, taxes levied at the manufacturing and import stage would be moved further down the distribution chain to the wholesale level and ultimately to the retail level. In all cases an effort would be made to implement the destination principle, by taxing imports, but not exports. However, it is more difficult for states than for national governments to employ conceptually ideal sales taxes. It is relatively easy for a state to levy turnover taxes on all goods produced or sold in the state. It is more difficult to distinguish between sales to consumers and sales to business or to implement a VAT, to tax services as well as goods, and to provide accurate border tax adjustments (compensating import duties and export rebates). Thus subnational governments may adopt taxes that subsequently seem like dinosaurs, by the standards of later economic thinking. Having done so, they may find it difficult to escape from the tyranny of the status quo.
Several aspects of the evolution of the state corporate income tax deserve mention. As long as corporations operated primarily within a single state, it was satisfactory to impose taxes on the profits of individual legal entities. The advent of multistate corporations, however, implied that formulas would be needed to apportion income among the states where a corporation operates. Indeed, unitary combination, in which the operations of affiliated corporations deemed to be engaged in a unitary business are combined, may be required, because of the difficulty of isolating the profits of related entities.
For many years the bulk of the state corporate taxes employed a three-factor apportionment formula that gave equal weight to payroll, property, and sales; the last was presumably included to provide revenue to market states, as well as to recognize in a rough way the contribution the market state makes to corporate profits. In recent years there has been a marked shift toward placing greater weight-or even sole weight-on the sales factor. This shift from origin-based factors (payroll and property) toward a destination-based factor (sales) can perhaps be explained in part as an attempt to reduce the tax-induced disincentive for location of economic activity in the taxing state.
ECONOMIC EVOLUTION AND THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
In considering how conventional wisdom on tax assignment might change to reflect economic evolution it will be useful to consider four prototypical types of economy and the tax assignments each seems to imply. 37 To some extent these 36 See Bird and Gendron (2000a) and (2000b) and Keen and Smith (1996) and (2000) and literature cited there. 37 Economic evolution also changes demands for services provided publicly, producing changes in expenditure assignment that can have important implications for tax assignment. As late as 1929 total tax receipts of all levels of government in the United States were less than 11 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), almost 2/3 of which were received by state and local governments, primarily from property taxes, which were used largely to finance education. Federal assumption of the costs of national defense and the welfare state explains the adoption or growth of the federal income tax and payroll taxes. I do not consider this further.
prototypes are intended to reflect the historical evolution of the economy of the United States. (That this discussion has strong temporal-historical overtones reinforces the importance of when the Martians land on earth.) But I do not intend to suggest that these prototypes exist in pure form in the real world or that they have ever existed; probably no economy has ever exhibited all the attributes of any of the prototypes, and no others. At any point in time a given economy may exhibit characteristics of all the previous prototypes. Economic evolution, however, with new attributes replacing old, probably does alter what might seem to be sensible tax assignments in roughly the ways indicated. In any event, the discussion highlights a number of issues that must be considered in deciding on tax assignment, showing how what seems like sensible assignment may change with economic conditions. A key conclusion is that, because of the rigidity of fiscal institutions, economic evolution may render earlier tax assignments inappropriate.
Agrarian Society
In a pre-industrial or agrarian society, there are relatively few "tax handles" 38 -but also modest demands for public services. 39 General income, payroll, and sales taxes are likely to be infeasible, because of the small scale of operations, the widespread use of cash to effect payments, and the lack of education and detailed record keeping required for compliance and administration; the presence of limited amounts of manufacturing and commerce, much of it informal, as in the most backwards of developing countries, does not alter this characterization. Instead, there may be heavy reliance on import duties, export duties, and excises, all of which are applied at "choke points" in the production-distribution process. Taxes on foreign trade are not a satisfactory source of revenue for subnational governments, and excises are not satisfactory if they cannot be based on the point of consumption, instead of the point of production or importation of excisable goods-something that is likely to be difficult in an agrarian society. In short, it is even more difficult to finance subnational government in a satisfactory manner than to finance the central government satisfactorily.
Property taxes levied by local "governments" may work fairly well in agrarian societies characterized by considerable homogeneity and readily identifiable benefits of public spending. 40 For example, agricultural smallholders may agree to join together to finance irrigation systems or education for their children, by levying a tax based on the value of their land. Since everyone knows everyone else and has a good idea of the value of their land, administration is relatively simple; it is not necessary to have a complicated cadastral survey to record ownership and values of properties, and moral suasion may be enough to elicit compliance.
Manufacturing/Purely Local Retail Commerce The Economy
In the second prototype manufacturing replaces agriculture as the backbone of the economy. Retail commerce is primarily local; that is, households buy mostly from local merchants. (Of course, merchants make purchases from out-of-state vendors, including manufacturers.) There are relatively few important services, the most 38 See also Musgrave (1969, esp. pp. 125-36) . 39 This statement is not intended to refer to modern societies that rely heavily on agriculture, such as Denmark and Iowa. 40 Indeed property taxation may work well in other circumstances of homogeneity and easily identified benefits, such as a tax on residential property in small-town America.
important being transportation, electricity, and telecommunications, all of which are subject to regulation, and no digitized content. Not only are there no mail order sales and no electronic commerce in this prototype-for convenience I assume that there is no cross-border shopping, no commuting across jurisdictional lines, and no tax-induced migration. Corporations (except for those involved in transportation and telecommunications) operate almost entirely within the state and are almost entirely locally owned; there is little out-of-state or foreign investment and there is no tax-induced migration of capital. 41 Because of the limited extent of markets, price competition is generally far less perfect than the standard theoretical model predicts.
Tax Assignment
In this economy the need for public revenues is likely greater than in the agrarian prototype. Manufacturing opens the door to modern tax instruments: income, payroll, and sales taxes. In advanced countries subnational governments may be able to levy any of these taxes; if so, the choice of taxes to assign to subnational governments may seem to be wide open (subject to constraints imposed by educational requirements and the use of cash).
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That is, there would seem to be little reason, in principle, not to assign sales taxes, income taxes, or payroll taxes to subnational governments, as there would (by assumption) be no issues of tax exporting (to out-of-state owners of capital, commuters, or cross-border shoppers) and no issues of revenue going to the "wrong" jurisdiction. Sales by remote vendors would, by assumption, pose no problem. On the other hand, in LDCs no tax may work well, even at the national level, except for taxes on natural resources, foreign trade taxes, and income taxes on corporations and the employees of large corporations and governments.
The federal government might be assigned the individual income tax because of concerns with income redistribution or macroeconomic stabilization. 43 A further reason to assign the income tax to the federal government is that the easiest way to administer state and local income taxes is as surcharges on the federal tax. (One of the most important benefits of surcharges, the possibility of implementing residencebased subnational income taxes, is not relevant in this prototype because there is assumed to be no cross-border commuting and little out-of-state investment.) While the conceptual case for a state corporation income tax is weak, such a tax would, by assumption, not distort the location of economic activity in this prototype. Given the assumed fragmentation of the economy, manipulation of transfer prices on interstate sales to corporate affiliates and the difficulty of determining the geographic source of income because of economic interdependence between 41 We might add assumptions about the characteristics of the primary determinants of the proper assignment of excises on motor fuels, tobacco products, and alcoholic beverages. If roads are primarily intrastate, motor fuel taxes should be assigned to the states; interstate highways should be financed by federal taxes. Taxes on tobacco products and distilled spirits are ideally assigned to the state of destination. If the products are manufactured centrally, state tax stamps are likely to be used to implement destination-based subnational taxes. Smuggling may be a problem if states levy substantially different taxes on products characterized by high ratios of value to weight and volume, such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco products. To save space I ignore the assignment of excises, other than those on telephone service and other public utilities, in what follows. 42 Of course, subnational duties on foreign and interstate trade should be forbidden. I do not consider these further. Note, however, the historical importance of eliminating duties on internal trade; for example, in the creation of modern Germany, in the provisions of the constitutions of Australia, Canada, and the United States (via the Commerce Clause), and in the formation of the European Common Market (now the EU). 43 In the United States concern with stabilization and income redistribution came well after introduction of the federal income tax-and perhaps after the economy had moved to the next prototypical stage.
affiliated firms might not be important problems; indeed, states might depart from the federal definition of taxable income without causing too much trouble, despite the advantages of uniformity. An apportionment formula that included payrolls, property, and sales at destination, to recognize the contributions of both producing states and market states, might seem appropriate. If the federal government were to be assigned the individual income tax because of concerns with income redistribution or macroeconomic stabilization (or simply because it got there first), it might seem appropriate to assign the sales tax to the states. Since each state and local economy is assumed to be somewhat autarchic in this prototype, little damage would be done if each state-and perhaps even each local jurisdiction, in some cases -were to define its own sales tax base and administer its own sales tax. Of course, administration and compliance is simplest if local sales taxes are levied as surcharges on state taxes and administered by the state. Indeed, a dual federal-state sales tax would provide some simplification of administration and compliance, but this does not seem particularly important, given the assumed fragmentation of the national economy in this prototype.
Services provided locally by regulated public utilities provide an attractive target for subnational taxation, including local taxation. Excises on such services can be justified as recouping some of the monopoly profits enjoyed by the utilities and as compensating for the use of the public right-of-way required for reticulation (that is, for telephone lines, power lines, and pipelines to customers).
Given the assumed unimportance of other services, exemption of services from the sales tax would be only a minor problem. Most sales to business would be covered by resale exemptions. Because of geographic fragmentation, purchasers are assumed not to be overly sensitive to taxinduced interstate differences in product prices; thus what pyramiding occurs may not be particularly bothersome. The RST seems to be the state sales tax of choice in the fragmented economy of this prototype, despite the theoretical advantages of the VAT, since the latter may require substantial interstate cooperation regarding the tax base and administration and cannot readily accommodate local surcharges.
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Property taxation is suitable for use by local governments in this prototype, but may be more problematic than in an agrarian society, because the economy is more complicated and taxation is no longer a joint and mutual effort conducted by equals. Besides having a cadastral survey of agricultural property, it is necessary to know the value and ownership of other very different kinds of properties: for example, urban residential real estate and commercial and industrial property. Taxation of the property of railroads and public utilities might be based on the unitary principle; that is, all the property of such an entity might be divided ratably among the jurisdictions where the entity operates, instead of being allocated only to the jurisdiction where the property is actually located.
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Because of the difficulty of finding adequate "tax handles," even at this stage of development, many developing countries have levied taxes on "industry and commerce." Richard Bird has suggested that, rather than following this path, which often leads to quite inferior forms of taxation, it might be appropriate for 44 This statement assumes that the VAT has been invented and that it could be used to implement state taxes.
See McLure (2000c) and references provided there. 45 In the United States the property of interstate railroads was divided among the states on the basis of miles of track in each state; see Dexter (1978) for a survey of this history. This practice provides a precedent for the unitary taxation of corporations, to be considered below.
local governments in LDCs to levy an origin-based VAT.
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Many of the tax assignments that seem sensible for this prototypical economy contain the seeds of future problems.
"Conventional" Commerce
The Economy
In this stage the economy has become more sophisticated and markets extend further, often across the boundaries of taxing jurisdictions. While households buy primarily from local merchants, they increasingly make mail-order purchases from out-of-state vendors; electronic commerce still does not exist. Cross-border shopping and commuting across jurisdictional lines become increasingly important. Corporations become national in both their operations and their ownership, as capital markets become national in scope. Economic transactions (e.g., commuting, migration, investment, and shopping, especially for "big-ticket" items and goods subject to excises) respond more to taxes. There is a pronounced shift from manufacturing to services.
Tax Assignment
Tax assignments that seemed to make sense in the previous prototype may now cause problems, depending on particular circumstances.
47 Assignment of sales taxation to state and local jurisdictions starts to seem especially problematic. The growth of regional shopping malls increases the likelihood that sales taxes paid by cross-border shoppers go to the wrong jurisdiction-those where the malls are located. If sales tax is applied to interstate sales by remote vendors, it creates a substantial barrier to interstate trade, due to the complexity caused by the myriad of state sales taxes, each with its own base and administrative requirements. 48 This complexity is compounded by the need to determine the local destination of each remote sale, so that local sales tax can be applied. Moreover, it may be difficult for a state to collect sales tax from an out-ofstate vendor, and efforts to collect tax from in-state purchasers are not likely to be successful, except in rare cases (registration of the taxable product or purchases by a business). If these sales are not taxed, the result is significant discrimination against local merchants. A dual federalstate RST (perhaps with local surcharges) seems attractive, as it would require a uniform tax base and uniform administrative requirements and would facilitate sourcing sales to the state level; if sourcing to local jurisdictions is needed, it would be vastly simpler under a uniform system. Alternatively, interstate cooperation could reduce the chaos that results from uncoordinated imposition of state sales taxes.
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The increasing sophistication of the economy aggravates problems. The failure to tax most services causes economic distortions and inequities. The taxation of business inputs implies that the sales tax effectively becomes a haphazard tax on certain kinds of income, rather than a general consumption tax. Besides implying that the advantages of consumption taxation are not obtained, this introduces an origin-based element into the sales tax, as well as distorting other economic choices.
50 A federal VAT would help pre-46 See and (2000b); Bird and Mintz (2000) . 47 Since the federal level is most likely to be successful in levying most taxes, I focus on problems of subnational taxation. 48 This explains why the U. S. Supreme Court has ruled that the states cannot constitutionally impose a duty to collect use tax on remote vendors in the absence of a physical presence in the state. The text ignores the further problems that would accompany local definition of the sales tax base and local administration. 49 This is essentially what happened when the European Common Market was created. See Hellerstein and McLure (2001) and the discussion of the tyranny of the status quo below. 50 See Zodrow (1999) . vent these problems, as well as facilitating administration. Although state surcharges on a federal VAT could be used to provide fiscal sovereignty for states, local surcharges on a VAT seem infeasible. States may see federal imposition of a sales tax of any kind as unwelcome.
Some forms of taxation may be more difficult to implement in a service economy. Whereas manufacturing and the exploitation of natural resources involves large numbers of employees, and thus a means of control, some services are more likely to be performed by small independent operators, who may be more difficult to monitor, for both income and sales tax purposes.
In this world state and local individual income taxes may look better than state and local sales taxes, despite commuting across jurisdictional boundaries. 51 In advanced countries residence-based subnational taxation of cross-border commuters can be handled by surcharges on the federal income tax. However, in developing countries residence-based surcharges may not be an option, because it is not realistic to require more than a small minority of the population to file income tax declarations; the rest pay income tax via withholding, which implies that subnational surcharges would go to the jurisdiction of employment.
The growth of national corporations means that geographic separate accounting is unworkable; it is essential to adopt formula apportionment to divide income among the jurisdictions where corporations operate. Economic interdependence between the component parts of corporate groups and the possibility of manipulating transfer prices makes unitary taxation attractive; indeed, some will argue that unitary combination should be applied on a worldwide basis, 52 but others claim that this is extraterritorial taxation. Because the location of economic activity is more sensitive to taxation than in previous prototypes, there is concern that inclusion of origin-based factors (e.g., payroll and property) in apportionment formulas creates a disincentive for the location of economic activity in the taxing state. In response, states begin to modify their apportionment formulas, complicating compliance and creating the possibility of the double taxation (or no taxation) that formula apportionment is designed to avoid. Differences in state and federal definitions of taxable income create administrative and compliance problems; uniformity, perhaps via the use of state surcharges on the national tax base, would offer obvious advantages. Excises on electricity and telephone services provide a bright spot in this otherwise rather gloomy picture. They are expanded to finance a variety of local services.
Globalized Commerce The Economy
In the fourth prototype the economy is "globalized." Corporations are multinational, rather than merely national, and both states and nations compete for investment. Much commerce has become electronic. Only a relatively small portion of e-commerce involves sales to consumers (business to consumer (B2C) transactions); the real changes from earlier prototypes involve electronic business-tobusiness (B2B) transactions-which in this world are almost all sales to business. In some sectors-primarily for essentially homogeneous commodities that are produced with constant or nearly constant returns to scale, where barriers to entry 51 Varian (2000) are low-economic reality approaches more nearly the perfect markets of the economists' model. Competition on an international scale for many commodities and some services increases the "perfection" of such markets. However, the expansion of high-tech industries with significant economies of scale and other barriers to entry creates new monopolies and oligopolies. A key feature of this prototype is that it is possible for unidentified purchasers to pay for undetectable digital products with untraceable money issued by off-shore institutions (which need not be financial institutions, in the conventional sense of that term). 53 Telephone and similar services are provided in a highly competitive unregulated market; they do not necessarily require wires.
Tax Assignment
Electronic commerce aggravates many of the problems encountered in the earlier prototypes. The increased perfection of markets implies that disincentives and other distortions caused by taxation are more important than in other prototypes. Distinctions between taxed goods and untaxed services and intangible products (e.g., music on compact disks and music downloaded from the Internet) become increasingly meaningless, create compliance problems, and distort choices. The fact that barriers to entry for commerce in digital content are relatively low implies that the complexity caused by lack of uniformity of state sales taxes looms larger than before. Electronic commerce aggravates administrative problems originally encountered in conventional commerce; especially important is the fact that transactions resemble much more closely those conducted using cash in earlier days. Digital content can be "smuggled" into a country or across state lines without being burdened by sales taxes.
Competition for investment puts downward pressure on national taxes on income from capital, as well as state taxes; there is fear that only income attributable to internationally immobile factors-especially labor-can be taxed without discouraging investment. (This statement assumes that most taxes on capital are not benefit taxes.) Permanent establishments (commonly employed to determine jurisdiction to impose income tax on non-resident corporations) may not be required for the conduct of business. Economic interdependence and opportunities to manipulate transfer prices are greater than in conventional commerce. Rules for apportionment of income in a world of conventional commerce may not suffice for a world of commerce in digital products, since intangible property may have no situs and it may be difficult to identify the destination of sales.
The changing environment for telephone services implies that excises levied on such services by state and local governments are no longer appropriate. Where signals travel without wires, excises cannot be justified as charges for use of the public right-of-way. In a competitive environment telephone taxes can no longer be justified as payments for the privilege of earning monopoly profits. Given competition from Internet telephony, taxes on telephone services distort economic choices. These taxes should be abolished and telephone services should be included in the sales tax base.
Natural Resources: A Digression
In some countries extraordinarily valuable natural resources are geographically 53 It may be that advances in technology, combined with international agreements, including agreements intended to end harmful competition from tax havens, may make some of the "unknowns" (e.g., the identity of the purchaser and the nature of products) in this description known. Attempts to utilize such technology and to conclude such agreements will, however, almost certainly encounter substantial opposition from privacy advocates. See also .
concentrated. The exploitation of natural resources raises vexing questions of tax assignment, especially if there are economic rents. While perhaps troubling at a time in history when natural resources loom large in the output of a state or nation, these issues are likely to recede over time if other sectors grow more rapidly.
Residents of resource-rich subnational jurisdictions may believe they have the right to tax such resources, which they may see as their "heritage."
54 Those not resident in the "lucky" state may wonder why the resources are not the heritage of the entire nation, raising questions of the nature of federalism in the country. Assignment of resource taxes primarily to subnational governments can create substantial horizontal fiscal disparities between jurisdictions at a given level and even vertical fiscal imbalance between levels of government.
In addition to being questionable on equity grounds, assignment of the right to tax important resources that are geographically concentrated has potentially adverse implications for economic efficiency; since resource-rich jurisdictions can either provide a given level of public services with lower non-resource taxes or provide more public services with a given level of taxes (or both), excessive amounts of private resources (including human effort) may flow to such jurisdictions. 55 Both equity and efficiency concerns are complicated by the fact that the governments of resource-rich areas may levy taxes to compensate for the cost of public services provided to the resource industry (e.g., roads and hospitals) or for environmental degradation experienced by their residents. Calculation of resource rents should take account of such costs.
Summary
As an economy evolves tax assignments that might seem to be appropriate may become inappropriate, or at least problematical. The most obvious example is the assignment of the sales tax to state and local governments. In a world of purely local B2C commerce interstate differences in tax bases and uncoordinated administration may be acceptable. Application of local surcharges to over-the-counter sales would not create major problems of compliance. The complexity inherent in independent state sales taxes and the need to "source" sales to the local level, however, could seriously impede the development of interstate mail order and electronic commerce.
There are several ways to resolve this issue; all involve substantial adjustment costs, and they face serious political obstacles. Perhaps most radical, state and local governments could abandon the sales tax field, presumably replacing lost revenues with revenues from individual income taxation. Alternatively, states could agree to coordinate their taxes, by adopting similar tax bases, uniform laws, and cooperative administration. 56 One way to do this is to impose state surcharges on the federal sales tax base (if there is a federal tax); a dual federal-state RST might accommodate local surcharges, but a dual VAT probably would not, because of the greater difficulty of dealing with credits for VAT on business purchases crossing local boundaries.
It is worth noting that the current debate on taxation of electronic commerce focuses on simplification of the state sales tax. This should not be surprising, since that is precisely where yesterday's con- 54 Note the italicized word in the name of the Alberta Heritage Saving Trust Fund, which was established during the energy crisis of the 1970s. 55 See Boadway and Flatters (1982) . Mieszkowksi and Toder (1983) conclude that these efficiency costs are generally small. 56 For a description and evaluation of recent efforts of this type, see McLure (forthcoming).
ventional wisdom is least appropriate to today's world. Reform efforts must confront the tyranny of the status quo, however, to be considered in the next section.
THE LEGACY OF HISTORY
Choices of tax assignment depend crucially on history and both reflect and determine the degree of sovereignty allowed (or enjoyed by) second-tier governments. As notes, "The tax assignment that actually prevails in any country inevitably reflects more the outcome of political bargaining in a particular historical situation than the consistent application of any normative principles."
Tax Assignment as a Reflection-and a Cause-of Weak and Strong States
Tax assignment in the United States reflects the fact that the constitution reserves to the states all powers not expressly granted to the federal government. Similarly, the Member States of the European Union, which are independent nations, retain virtually all taxing powers, assigning almost none to the Union.
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By comparison, the constitutions of many developing countries-especially those that have unitary systems-give subnational governments few taxing powers. For example, the Constitution of South Africa, which has a unitary government, concentrates taxing power at the national level and provides the provinces relatively limited taxing powers. To the extent that expenditures are appropriately conducted at the provincial level, this may create vertical fiscal imbalance.
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Weak and Strong States: A Tale of Two Federations 59
Australia and Canada, despite their obvious similarities (e.g., both are large, sparsely populated former British colonies with federal systems), provide an interesting contrast of how history affects tax assignment, resulting in strong and weak subnational governments. 60 In Canada the constitutional provision limiting provinces to "direct taxation within the province" would seem to eliminate the possibility of provincial sales taxes, which economists commonly categorize as indirect taxes.
61 Provincial retail sales taxes, however, have been found to satisfy this prohibition, which has been interpreted as being intended to prevent tax exporting.
62 Because the provinces can levy both income taxes and sales taxes, they are fiscally "strong;" they can pay their own way and are accountable to their electorate to be fiscally responsible be- 57 The Treaty of Rome requires unanimous consent to impose restrictions on taxation. Member States have, however, agreed to limit exercise of taxing powers, especially in the area of indirect taxation, in order to create a single market. See also McLure and Weiner (2000, pp. 27-80) and references cited there. 58 Actually many of the backlogs of services that are the legacy of apartheid are best addressed at the local level, where revenue sources-property taxes and charges for services provided by public utilities-are somewhat more adequate, at least in urban areas. That the provinces are fiscally weak reflects, at least in part, the wishes of the African National Congress, which controls the national parliament, but not those of several important provinces (KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape). 59 Analogous comparisons could be made between the highly decentralized federation of Brazil and the centralized federations of Argentina and Mexico. 60 Of course, the chain of causation is neither unidirectional (from history to tax assignment to the degree of centralization) nor simple. The web of interrelated forces is far more complex; see, for example, Courchene (1996) . Where there is a desire for centralization, subnational governments are not likely to have the ability to raise significant revenues. 61 This provision is in Section 92 of the 1867 British North America Act (BNAA), the predecessor to the Canadian constitution, which was "patriated" in 1982. For an excellent summary of the Canadian system of tax assignment, see Boadway (1997) . 62 See Boadway (1997, pp. 67-70) . The VAT levied by Quebec has been ruled to be acceptable because tax collected before the retail level is reimbursed via the tax credit mechanism.
cause they control marginal sources of revenues.
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In Australia the situation has developed quite differently; the states do not pay their own way and their governments are thus not accountable or fiscally responsible. The primary culprit is judicial interpretation of Section 90 of the constitution, which states, ". . . the power of the Parliament to impose duties of customs and of excise . . . shall become exclusive." This might seem to allow state sales taxes, but it has been interpreted as prohibiting them. Whereas economists might define excises to be selective sales taxes levied on either the production or the consumption of particular products, the High Court of Australia, through interpretations that have become increasingly inclusive over time, has defined them as "taxes directly related to goods imposed 'at some step' in their production or distribution before they reach the hands of the consumers."
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The different assignment of the income tax in the two countries also reflects history. In both countries the exigencies of financing World War II led to the concentration of income taxation at the federal level. In Canada this taxing power was only "rented" to the federal government and thus was returned to the provinces after the War. In Australia, however, the federal government has relied on Section 96 of the constitution (". . . until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit.") to avoid returning the income tax to the states. 65 Recent reforms in Australia have further increased state fiscal reliance on the Commonwealth government. 66 Revenues from a newly enacted VAT (called the Goods and Services Tax or GST) are to be allocated to the states, in exchange for repeal of a variety of minor state taxes. As part of the deal, Commonwealth "equalisation grants" to the states are being reduced; the upshot is that the federal government will, in effect, retain about 60 percent of revenues from the GST. The same methodology will be used to determine state shares in GST revenues as for the previous equalization grants. Any change in the base or rate of the GST requires the unanimous agreement of all the 63 This statement must be qualified by the fact that provinces can be characterized as "haves" and "have nots."
The latter (primarily the Maritime provinces) receive substantial grants from the federal government and have recently entered into an arrangement whereby they share revenues from the federal VAT; see Bird and Gendron (1998) . Even so, because of the income tax, they have substantial fiscal autonomy at the margin, unlike the Australian states. 64 From Bolton v. Madsen (1963), quoted in Petchey and Shapiro (1997, p. 44) . A consistent definition appears in Capital Duplicators v. Australian Capital Territory (No. 2) (1993) . It appears that the framers of the Australian constitution did not know what they intended the crucial words "duties of excise" to mean; Saunders (1997, p. 26) , quotes High Court Justice HcHugh as saying, "They did not seem to understand, really, what they were about." Saunders notes (p. 24) that the definition may have seemed unimportant when the constitution was being written, since excises accounted for only 5 percent of the revenues of all the colonies (the forerunners of the Australian states). Until recently the High Court ironically accepted as constitutional franchise fees on sellers of alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, and petroleum products, which are subject to excises throughout the world, provided they were worded sufficiently artfully to avoid being classified as excises. In 1997 all state business franchise taxes were, in effect, declared unconstitutional. 65 It must be acknowledged that state politicians have not always been anxious to have this power, recognizing that, in a phrase quoted in Walsh (1996, p. 125) , and (with slightly different wording) Collins (2000, p. 59) states and the federal government. The substitution of GST revenue, over which the states exercise no control, for revenue from previous state levies, which were subject to state control, implies that the reforms weaken state governments and increase vertical fiscal imbalance in Australia.
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The "Tyranny of the Status Quo"
The "tyranny of the status quo" is a special legacy of fiscal history. In 1967 Brazil assigned the VAT to the states, before it was generally realized that it is administratively difficult to implement subnational VATs. To compound matters, the Brazilian state VAT is an origin-based levy, which creates various additional economic and administrative problems.
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Recently Ricardo Varsano (2000) has made a convincing case for a novel method of administering a destination-based state VAT. 69 Even so, and despite the conceptual arguments for either shifting the VAT to the federal level or switching to a destination-based state tax, the political influence of the states makes it difficult to achieve either reform.
70
This tyranny can also be seen in the United States. Several episodes of interest in a federal VAT have encountered serious opposition from state and local governments, who see the sales tax base as uniquely theirs; federal interest in an RST would probably face even fiercer opposition. 71 On the other hand, arguments that state and local governments should abandon the sales tax in favor of the individual income tax, because of difficulties in implementing subnational sales taxesarguments that would be valid if we were starting de novo-must address the wrenching practical problems transition would cause, as well as political opposition to change.
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The complexity of the state sales taxes also reflects history; the "system" "just growed," as each state chose its own definition of taxable sales, wrote its own statutes, regulations, and administrative rules, and determined the conditions under which local jurisdictions could also tax sales. The resulting complexity and other irrational elements of the taxes (notably, taxation of many sales to business and exemption of many sales to consumers) show amazing immunity to change, despite their manifest disadvantages. Of special practical importance is the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court, relying heavily on stare decisis-the judicial embodiment of the tyranny of the status quo-has found the sales tax "system" so complicated that states cannot require remote (out-of-state) vendors who lack a physical presence in the state to collect tax on sales made into a state.
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Development of the VAT in Europe provides an interesting contrast to this. When the European Common Market was cre-67 Of course, in both Australia and Canada the federal government also has less fiscal autonomy under the tax sharing arrangement, due to the requirement that state or provincial governments (in HST provinces) acquiesce in VAT changes. 68 See McLure (2000c) . This is not to say that a destination-based VAT would not pose problems; but these would be somewhat different and primarily administrative, not economic (except to the extent that insurmountable administrative problems created economic distortions). 69 See also McLure (2000c) . Varsano had originally made this proposal in 1995. 70 Varsano notes that the economically and politically powerful Southern industrial states face a quandary. They benefit from the use of the origin principle for interstate trade. However, they-like other states-are hurt by the tax wars that the origin principle engenders. 71 One potential political advantage of a federal subtraction-method VAT is the fact that it looks less like a sales tax, even though it might have quite similar economic effects. 72 See the contrasting views of Varian (2000) and McLure (2000a) . The fact that five states do not even have an income tax would greatly increase these transitional problems. 73 For more on this topic, including state efforts to simplify the system, see McLure (forthcoming) and references cited there.
ated, the Member States decided that they must have a harmonized sales tax system, in order to avoid interference with internal trade. Thus they threw out the status quo, consisting primarily of turnover taxes, which were notorious for their distortions, and adopted a more nearly uniform system based on the VAT. 74 This suggests that when conditions are fluid and the stakes are high enough, the status quo can be overcome. It will be interesting to see whether the fear of lost revenue created by the advent of electronic commerce -a fear that may subside with the decline of the high-flying dot.com economyprovides enough stimulus for the American states to radically simplify their systems, in order to gain either Congressional or judicial approval of efforts to impose on remote vendors an expanded duty to collect tax.
The Legacy of Socialism
The members of the former Soviet Union, whether they be federations such as Russia or unitary governments such as Kazakstan and Ukraine, have relied heavily on tax sharing, instead of either surcharges or independent taxation.
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This reflects several legacies of the Soviet period: the use of tax sharing under the Soviet system of central planning; the lack of the administrative capacity (and the data) needed to implement surcharges, let alone independent taxation by subnational governments; the existence of quasi-dictatorial central governments operating behind a facade of democracy in some countries; and (at least in Kazakstan, which has a unitary government) mistrust of lower-level governments to implement appropriate choices, because of lack of experience with democracy. Conversely, governments of Russian oblasts (most notably the resource-rich oblasts in Eastern Siberia) wish to levy their own taxes, because-for valid historical and current economic reasons-they do not trust the central government to deliver oblast shares of revenues collected by the federal government and/or do not think taxsharing formulas are fair.
CONCLUSION
It is dangerous to assume that "one size fits all" in the area of tax assignment. What might seem sensible may be rendered foolish-by advances in the technology of taxation (for example, the invention of the VAT, once unknown, then thought to be appropriate only for central governments, and now thought perhaps to be suitable for states), by improved understanding of the effects of taxation (for example, the results of taxing business inputs or including origin-based factors in formulas used to apportion corporate income among jurisdictions), and by economic evolution (for example, the shift from a manufacturing economy with primarily local retailing to a globalized digital economy dominated by services). This danger is seen no more clearly than in the sales tax employed by most of the American states and half of the Canadian provinces. Reflecting their origins in a much more autarchic time when we worried much less about the economic effects of taxes (both because economists knew less about these effects and because the effects were smaller), these taxes exhibit substantial problems: application to many business purchases, exemption of many services, inordinate complexity, and de facto exemption of many direct purchases by households. A more rational tax assignment, 74 Hellerstein and McLure (2001) discuss this contrasting history of the American sales tax and the European VAT more fully. Of course, this substitution is much easier than replacing state sales with income taxes. 75 This is equally true in other countries that had (or have) socialist systems, such as Vietnam and the nations of Eastern Europe. See Wallich (1994) , the papers in Bird, Ebel, and Wallich (1995) , and Martinez and McLure (1999) . Engelshalk (1997) reports on decentralization of taxing powers in Central and Eastern Europe.
given what we know now, might lodge sales taxation at the federal level, with state and local governments relying more heavily on residence-based individual income taxes implemented as surcharges on the federal tax. Such a radical reform is unlikely, however, as is perhaps the rationalization of the existing sales taxes, because of the tyranny of the status quo.
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